Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Discussion Papers

Economic Growth Center

6-1-2005

Cross-Border Donations and Pareto-Efficient Tariffs
Masahiro Endoh

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series

Recommended Citation
Endoh, Masahiro, "Cross-Border Donations and Pareto-Efficient Tariffs" (2005). Discussion Papers. 923.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/923

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information,
please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER
YALE UNIVERSITY
P.O. Box 208629
New Haven, CT 06520-8269
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/

CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 915

Cross-Border Political Donations and
Pareto-Efficient Tariffs
Masahiro Endoh
Yale University

June 2005

Notes: Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussions
and critical comments.
The author wishes to thank Koichi Hamada, T.N. Srinivasan, Paola Conconi, Eric Bond,
Pravin Krishna, and Chia-Hui Lu for their helpful comments. Nevertheless, the author
alone is responsible for any errors that appear in this paper.

This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network
electronic library at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=756966
An index to papers in the Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper Series is located at:
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/research.htm

Cross-border Political Donations and Pareto-Efficient Tariffs *
Masahiro Endoh

Abstract
This paper examines the effects of lobbying activities across international borders, on
determining each country’s import tariff in a multi-principal, multi-agent, menu-auction model.
Cross-border political donations could promote international policy cooperation because of two
of their distinctive characteristics. First, special interest groups use cross-border donations as
tools to wield their influence on ruling parties of other countries directly, which promotes
efficiency of policy formation.

Second, for ruling parties of countries, cross-border donations

make them take into account the impact of their policy on other countries, which makes them
more sensitive to other countries’ welfare and, therefore, more cooperative with others.

When

ruling parties estimate the worth of political contributions from national special interest groups
and from foreign lobbying groups with the same weight, Pareto-efficient tariffs are attained at
which world welfare is maximized.

JEL Classifications: D72, F13, H21, P48
Keywords: Cross-border Donations, Truthful Equilibrium, Pareto-Efficient Tariffs.
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1. Introduction
Foreign donations to domestic political parties are generally considered to be harmful
to a nation’s independence. The climate of public opinion around the world with regard to
cross-border political contributions is gradually but continuously strengthening to the point
that would demand the delegitimization of accepting such donations.

In fact, after the 1990’s,

some countries, such as Canada, the Czech Republic, the Russian Federation, the U.K. and
Singapore, revised their regulations regarding political funding in order to prohibit national
political parties from accepting contributions from foreign sources.

In Canada, The Canada

Elections Act was amended in 1993 to prohibit candidates and parties from receiving campaign
contributions from abroad.

In the U.K., The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act

2000 was enacted, aiming to regulate political donations, including a ban on foreign donations.
The prevailing opinion among these countries is that foreign campaign contributions threaten
their right to maintain their sovereignty, determine their own laws, and elect their own officials,
free of outside interference.1
These negative circumstances for foreign political donations don’t mean, however, that
the topic is not worth considering.
policy cooperation in two ways.

Rather, it is possible they could promote international

First, if the donors of political contributions are permitted to

give donations to foreign countries, they could use their donations as tools to wield their
influence on ruling parties of countries directly, which would promote efficiency of policy
formation. Second, the ruling parties of countries, recipients of political contributions, would
take into account the impact of their policy on other countries, which would make them more
sensitive to other countries’ welfare and, therefore, more cooperative with others. I explain
these two benefits of cross-border political donations in this paper, taking import tariffs as an
example.

When ruling parties estimate the worth of political contributions from national

special interest groups and from foreign lobbying groups with the same weight, Pareto-efficient
tariffs are attained at which world welfare is maximized.

This result implies that cross-border

political contributions per se are not harmful for the formation of cooperative economic policies.
My economic analysis of political donations from abroad is inspired by two
observations.

First, two papers presented figures that show that foreign lobbying had a

significant impact on the trade policy of the U.S.

The pioneering work of Gawande, Krishna,

and Robbins (2004) empirically demonstrated that in the years 1978 - 82, the presence of an
organized non-U.S. lobby representing a particular industrial sector had as much effect on
1

lowering tariffs against imports in that sector as did the presence of a U.S. lobby in raising
tariffs there.

Kee, Olarreaga, and Silva (2004) also showed that lobbying expenditures in the

U.S. by Latin American exporters are a significant determinant of tariff preferences granted by
the U.S. in the years 1997 - 2000.2

Seeing the positive effect of foreign lobbying activity on U.S.

trade policy, it is natural to extend it to consider the case of “multilateral lobbying,” that is, the
combined case of domestic lobbying activities and two-way cross-border lobbying activities both
from the home country to the foreign and from the foreign country to the home.
A second observation is that some scholars of international law found positive aspects
of foreign donations in their research.

Damrosch (1989) concludes that nonforcible political

influence, including political funding which comes from foreign sources, has the potential both
for enhancing internationally protected human rights and for promoting constructive,
nonviolent relations between states, with the condition that it doesn’t prevent the people of
another state from exercising their political rights and freedoms.

As for research focusing

more on the economic aspect, Powell (1996) asserts that foreign corporations have a legitimate
right to express their interests in some manner, since they have a significant interest in the
domestic policies of other countries.

He argues that the international community should

direct its attention to attacking international bribery, instead of instituting blanket
prohibitions against all types of foreign campaign contributions.

My research complements

these arguments from the point of view of economics, showing that foreign donations would
make trade policies more cooperative internationally.
It is curious to see that the significance of foreign donations to domestic political
parties has almost been neglected as a subject of economic research until recently, with the
exception of Grossman and Helpman (1995) and Hamada (1993).

Grossman and Helpman

(1995) analyze in their appendix the conditions under which a free trade agreement could be
concluded by two small countries in the case when politicians were permitted to accept
donations from abroad.

They found that the conditions in the case permitting cross-border

donations could be more or less stringent than the conditions in the case prohibiting them,
depending on the circumstances.

Hamada (1993) considers the situation where one home

lobby gave a political contribution in order that its home government would protect its profit,
while one foreign lobby also donated to the home government in order to pressure it for free
trade.

In his setting, permitting a foreign donation would increase the national welfare of the

home country.

My paper extends Hamada (1993) in order to consider the effect of two-way

lobbying across borders on import tariffs of two large countries in a general way by employing
the theoretical foundation of Grossman and Helpman (1994).
Readers might consider my research target to be exceptional cases if we assume that
the ban on accepting political donations from abroad is dominant in the world.
2

In fact,

political funding laws differ from country to country in their approach to foreign contributions.
It is true that some large countries, the United States (U.S.), Canada, the United Kingdom
(U.K.), France, and Japan, for example, have laws against foreign donations.
however, other countries that tolerate such donations explicitly or implicitly.

There are,

Germany, the

Scandinavian countries, Australia, and New Zealand, for example, permit their national parties
to accept donations from abroad.

Switzerland and Austria, proud of their permanent

neutrality, admit foreign donations.

According to Austin and Tjernström (2003), among 111

countries which are categorized as “free” and “partly free” concerning political rights and civil
liberties in the 2002 Freedom House Index, and whose data are reported, only about one third
(40 countries) have regulations totally banning political donations from foreign sources.
Table 1 classifies the number of countries which totally ban foreign donations by
income and by region, reported in Austin and Tjernström (2003).

This table shows that

national income and per capita income of a country have little to do with whether that country
admits or bans political donations from abroad. As for income, high national income countries
and high per capita income countries don’t necessarily totally ban political donations from
abroad.

Among 29 countries whose national GDP is more than 100,000 million US$, fewer

than half totally ban foreign donations, and among 28 countries whose GDP per capita is more
than 10,000 US$, only about two fifths do.

As for regions, each of them has a significant

number of countries which permit national parties to accept foreign contributions. Countries
which tolerate foreign donations are neither exceptions nor symbols of underdevelopment.
They are dispersed throughout the globe.
Previous achievements in economics provide us with tools to analyze this problem.
employ the notion of truthful strategy introduced by Bernheim and Whinston (1986).

I

With the

multi-principal, one-agent and first-price menu-auction model, under the assumption of
complete information, they show that a truthful Nash equilibrium is always efficient and stable.
Grossman and Helpman (1994) apply this equilibrium concept in a model of endogenous policy
determination.

Their reformulation of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) provides us a tractable

way of thinking about the influence of lobbies on their government’s policy decisions.

The

theoretical analysis of “multilateral lobbying” needs truthful strategy in a multi-principal
multi-agent model, which was first proposed by Grossman and Helpman (1996) in a certain
environment, and later by Prat and Rustichini (2003) in a more general case.

The concept of

weakly truthful equilibrium by Prat and Rustichini (2003) preserves the desirable
characteristic of efficiency, which my results rely on.

Although they don’t consider strategic

interdependency between agents, my model shows that, under certain circumstances, the
efficient equilibrium is attained even under the existence of strategic relationships.
Various papers have investigated how to establish efficient trade policies and ensure
3

freer trade, given the absence of a supra-national authority to enforce the terms of agreements
concerning tariffs.

Previous research is mainly divided into two groups.

The first one

examined the role of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) to promote self-enforcing efficient tariff regimes. Dixit (1987), Bagwell
and Staiger (1990), Riezman (1991), Maggi (1999) and Ederington (2001) treat GATT/WTO as a
forum for repeating negotiation with the threat to retaliate for violation.

Bagwell and Staiger

(1999) evaluate the reciprocity principle of the GATT and find that it can assist governments in
achieving efficient policy outcomes by eliminating the terms-of-trade effect of protection.
The second group looked at the noninstitutional interdependency of decision-making
between economic activities as a tool to decrease tariffs endogenously.

Devereux and Lee

(1999) examine the interaction between international financial markets and trade policy, and
find that free trade tends toward equilibrium when international financial markets are fully
diversified.

Krishna and Mitra (2005) discuss the idea that unilateral tariff reduction by a

large country can induce a trading counterpart to reduce its tariff in return, with the model of
endogenous lobby formation.

Blanchard (2005) shows that export-platform foreign direct

investment (FDI) induces unilateral tariff liberalization by the FDI-source country, suggesting
that international capital mobility may substitute for multilateral trade liberalization.

Limão

(2005) analyses the linkage of retaliation between trade policy and environmental policy, and
shows that if they are strategic complements then policy linkage can sustain more cooperation
in both issues than no-linkage.

This paper belongs to this group; I propose “multilateral

lobbying” as a new tool to attain Pareto-efficient tariffs.

Using multilateral lobbying the

conditions for Pareto-efficiency are clear and simple.
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the basic economic
structure of two countries involved in trade with each other.

Section 3 considers domestic

lobbying activities by national special interest groups, which propose their schedule of
donations to the national ruling party.
account additionally in the model.

Section 4 takes cross-border lobbying activities into

Section 5 examines the conditions in which the permission

of both kinds of lobbying leads the economy to Pareto-efficiency and the sum of the two
countries’ welfare is maximized.
negative externality.

Section 6 extends the model to the case of nonpecuniary

Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and presents policy implication.

2. The Model
Consider a two-country multi-good general equilibrium model of trade.
home (no *) and foreign (*), produce and trade competitively N+1 goods. 3

Two countries,
Good 0 is a

numeraire good, which is traded freely across countries and serves to settle the balance of trade.
4

Numeraire good 0 is produced by labor alone, with constant returns to scale.
that a world and domestic price of good 0 is equal to one.

I choose units so

It is assumed that aggregate labor

supply, L , is large enough to sustain a positive output of good 0.

This implies that wage rates

in numeraire terms are equalized to one across countries.
Each of the non-numeraire goods i = 1, 2, …, N is produced by labor and a
sector-specific input, with constant returns to scale.
supply.
tariffs

Specific inputs are available in inelastic

Ruling parties (RPs) in the home and foreign countries use a vector of specific import

τ = (τ 1 , K ,τ N ) as a policy instrument. The local price of good i in terms of the

numeraire good 0 is thus given by pi = piw + τ i , where piw is the world price4.

With a wage

rate equal to one, the total rent Ri accruing to the specific factor in sector i depends only on
the local price of the good, and thus can be expressed as Ri ( pi ) .

Industry supply is then given

by Yi ( p i ) = ∂Ri ∂pi .
The country is populated by a number of H individuals, who have identical preferences
with their utility functions taking the following form:
N

(1)

u (c0 , c1 ,..., c N ) ≡ c 0 + ∑ u i (ci ) ,
i =1

where c 0 and ci are the consumption of numeraire good 0 and non-numeraire good i,
respectively.

u i (ci ) is assumed to be twice differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave.

Provided that income always exceeds expenditure on the nonnumeraire goods, the
domestic demand for good i can be expressed as a function of local price alone, i.e., Di ( pi ) .
Net import demand is then M i ( pi ) = Di ( p i ) − Yi ( pi ) .

The world untaxed price, piw , is

determined by the market-clearing condition:
(2)

(

)

M i (τ i , piw ) + M i* τ i* , piw = 0 .

From Equation (2), we can derive an expression for world equilibrium prices as a function of the

5

policies in the two countries, i.e., piw

(τ ,τ ) .
i

*
i

Domestic welfare is defined as the total amount of labor income, rent, tariff revenue,
and consumer surplus.5
N
N
H
⎡H
W τ ,τ * ≡ L + ∑ Ri τ i ,τ i* + ∑τ i M i τ i ,τ i* + H ⎢∑ u i ci τ i ,τ i* − ∑ pi ci τ i ,τ i*
i =1
i =1
i =1
⎣ i =1

(

(3)

(

)

)

(

)

( (

))

(

)⎤⎥ .
⎦

The RP in each country sets its import tariff as a policy instrument in order to
maximize its objective function.

In the case in which the RP doesn’t accept any donations, it is

assumed to try to maximize its domestic welfare in order to enhance political support from the
domestic electorate and ensure that it will stay in power after the next election. Therefore, the
objective function of RP, G

(

)

(

N

(N to the upper right denotes “no donations”), is described as

)

G N τ ;τ * ≡ W τ , τ * .6
When each RP sets its tariff unilaterally to maximize its domestic welfare, taking the
tariff of the other country as given, the first-order conditions for maximization of the RP’s
objective function is defined by
(4)

GτNi ≡ Wτ i ≡ M iφi + τ i

∂M i
(1 − φi ) = 0 ,
∂pi

where − φi ≡ ∂piw ∂τ i , 0 < φi < 1 .

GτNi and Wτ i represent the partial derivative of the RP’s

objective function ( G ) and domestic welfare ( W ) with respect to the tariff on good i ( τ i ),
N

respectively.

(5)

where

From Equations (2) and (4), the reaction function of

τ iN (τ i* ) = −

τ i can be expressed as

piφi
pi*
=
,
ε iM (1 − φi ) ε iM *

ε iM ≡ (∂M i ∂pi )( pi M i ) and ε iM * ≡ (∂M i* ∂pi* ) ( pi* M i* ) are the home and foreign

price elasticities of import demand or export supply, depending on whether M i is positive or
negative. Equation (5) is a familiar expression of optimal tariff, coming from the monopoly
power to change the terms of trade.

When the home country is the exporter of good i, for

6

example,

ε iM > 0 and ε iM * < 0 , then τ iN < 0 , which means the home country levies positive

tax on the export of good i.

The changes of

(dτ

Equation (5) is denoted by
hereinafter.

i

dτ i*

)

R

τ i and τ i* under the condition of satisfying

, and the case

(dτ

i

dτ i*

)

R

> 0 is considered

Also, I assume a set of Equation (5) and the corresponding equation for the other

country has a unique and stable equilibrium.

3. Domestic Lobbying
In this section, I examine the situation in which the RP accepts political contributions
from domestic special interest groups (SIGs) only.
formed by its people.

The country has K domestic SIGs which are

The welfare of j-th SIG is W

j

(τ ,τ ), j = 1, 2, …, K.
*

Neither the

preference of each SIG for tariffs nor the number of constituent members of it matters.
are two critical assumptions about SIGs which I accept hereinafter.

There

First, SIGs are well

organized in both countries, and all the individuals belong to just one of the domestic SIGs, that
is, W = Σ jW .7
j

concave.

Second, W

is assumed to be twice differentiable, increasing, and strictly

j

These assumptions assure
K

K

Wτ i = ∑ Wτ ij , Wτ * = ∑ Wτ *j .

(6)

j =1

i

j =1

i

Each SIG decides its amount of donation to the national RP, which is in the position to
set policy, in order to maximize SIG’s welfare.
opposition parties.

The SIGs are assumed not to contribute to any

The RP, on the other hand, chooses

τ to maximize a weighted sum of

donations from national SIGs and net aggregate national welfare after deducting donations,
with

τ * as given. This decision-making process is analyzed as the following two-stage game.

First, each SIG chooses its own bilateral contract schedule, which is publicly observable,
simultaneously and noncooperatively. j-SIG in the home country offers a schedule of tariff
vector,

τ , and the amount of donation, C Dj , to the RP (D to the upper right denotes “domestic

donations”).

The contract schedule can be rewritten as C

predicts correctly how the shift of our

Dj

(τ ,τ (τ )) = C (τ ) , since each SIG
*

Dj

τ causes the other country to change τ * , based on the

corresponding Equation (5) for the other country.
7

Second, each RP decides whether to accept

or reject the SIGs’ offers, and then chooses

τ (for the RP in the home country) or τ * (in the

foreign country), simultaneously and noncooperatively.

RP’s objective function under the

circumstance of existing contribution from domestic SIGs, G

D

(τ ;τ ), is
*

K
K
⎛
⎞
G D τ ;τ * ≡ (1 − α )⎜⎜W τ ,τ * − ∑ C Dj (τ )⎟⎟ + α ∑ C Dj (τ ) ,
j =1
j =1
⎝
⎠

(

(7)

)

(

)

assuming 1 2 < α ≤ 1 in order that the RP values campaign contributions positively and,
therefore, accepts them.
I solve this two-stage game backwards.
maximize its objective function.

At the second stage, the RP decides

Differentiation of Equation (7) with

τ to

τ i creates the following

first-order condition for maximization of objective function for the RP.
K

GτDi ≡ (1 − α )Wτ i − (1 − 2α )∑ CτDji = 0 .

(8)

j =1

Next, at the first stage, SIGs choose contract offers.

To calculate the equilibrium of

contracts, I employ the idea of “truthful” equilibrium in Bernheim and Whinston (1986), which
is applied to a model of endogenous policy determination by Grossman and Helpman (1994).
Truthful equilibrium needs to be jointly efficient for SIGs and the RP.
that G

D

Joint efficiency means

is maximized, subject to constraints on the levels of each SIG’s welfare anchor, W .
j

In equilibrium, the following equation is satisfied concerning the contract schedule of j-SIG.8
(9)

(

)

C Dj (τ ) = W j τ ,τ * − W j .
Each SIG decides the menu of monetary contribution to the national RP and the

request of its tariff vector under the constraint of Equation (9).

That is, in truthful

equilibrium of contract offers, the following condition is satisfied for each SIG.
(10)

CτDji = Wτ ij + Wτ *j
i

dτ i*
dτ i

.
R*

This equation means that, in the first stage, each SIG correctly predicts the reaction of the

(

other country’s tariff ( dτ i dτ i
schedule of donation.9

*

)

R*

) and takes it into consideration when it proposes its

Substitute Equation (10) into Equation (8) and use Equations (2) and

(6), and the first-order condition for maximization of objective function for the RP is expressed
8

as Equation (11).

Wτ i + ϕWτ *

(11)

i

dτ i*
dτ i

= 0,
R*

where Wτ * = (M i − τ i ∂M i ∂pi )φi

and

*

i

functions

ϕ = (2α − 1) α .

Equation (11) defines reaction

τ iD (τ i* , α ) for the case when the RP accept political donations from national SIGs as

follows:
(12)

where

τ iD (τ i* , α ) = −

pi (φ i + π i )
p i* (φ i + π i )
,
=
ε iM (1 − φi − π i ) ε iM * (φi − (φi π i 1 − φi ))

π i = ϕφi* (dτ i* dτ i ) R* > 0 , and π i < 1 − φi .10
From the comparison of Equation (12) with (5), we see 0 < τ i

N

(τ ) < τ (τ
*
i

D
i

the country is an importer of good i and levies a positive import tariff on it ( ε i

M

*
i

)

, α when

< 0 ), while

τ iD (τ i* , α ) < τ iN (τ i* ) < 0 when the country is an exporter of good i and imposes a positive export
tariff on it ( ε i

M

> 0 ), at any τ i* and α . This shows that the RP enhances trade barriers

when it accepts political contributions from national SIGs.

The rationale behind this

relationship is that the welfare of the country increases when the other country decreases its
trade barriers ( Wτ * < 0 in the case that the country is the exporter of good i, and Wτ * > 0 in
i

i

the case that the country is its importer), and national SIGs can make the RP in the other
country decrease its trade barriers by demanding that the domestic RP increase its trade

(

barriers ( dτ i dτ i
*

)

R*

> 0 ) by means of political donations. We also see from Equation (12) the

τ iD and α : ∂τ iD ∂α > 0 when the country levies a

monotonous relationship between
positive import tariff on good i ( ε i

M

positive export tariff on it ( ε i

M

< 0 ), while ∂τ iD ∂α < 0 when the country imposes a

> 0 ). This shows that when the RP highly values domestic

9

donations, its trade barriers increases.

These discussions are summarized in the following

proposition.

Proposition 1. When an RP is permitted to accept political donations from national
SIGs, an RP increases its import/export tariffs. The more an RP evaluates domestic donations,
the more the country’s tariffs increase.
From Equation (11), when

α = 1 in the home country and α * ≤ 1 2 in the foreign

country (in the case in which a foreign RP doesn’t receive domestic donations), the intersection
point

(

of

reaction

) (

− Wτ i Wτ * = dτ i* dτ i
i

τ iD (τ i* , α )

functions

)

R*

.

and

τ iD* (τ i , α * )

satisfies

the

condition

This is a Stackleberg equilibrium in which the home country is the

leader and foreign country is the follower.

This implies that when the foreign country doesn’t

permit domestic lobbying activities, the home country is better off permitting domestic lobbying
and moving equilibrium toward a Stackleberg equilibrium.

Under the restriction of

1 2 < α ≤ 1 and 1 2 < α * ≤ 1 , however, a new equilibrium in the case of existing domestic
lobbying in both countries can be the point at which both countries are worse off.

4. Multilateral Lobbying
This section considers the case of multilateral lobbying, in which each SIG is permitted
to give its donation across the border, and each RP accepts donations both from domestic and
foreign SIGs. j-SIG chooses publicly observable bilateral contract offers C
RP (domestic lobbying) and C
Similarly, j*-SIG chooses C

C j

D* j *

(τ (τ ),τ ) = C (τ )
*

(τ )
*

C j

*

*

Dj

(τ )

to the home

to the foreign RP (cross-border lobbying).

to the foreign RP and C

C * j*

(τ ,τ (τ )) = C (τ )
*

C * j*

to the

home RP. The RP’s objective function for the home (foreign) country in the case of multilateral
lobbying is G

M

(τ ;τ )
*

(G

M*

(τ ,τ ) ) (M to the upper right represents “multilateral lobbying”),
*

which is composed of national welfare W ( W ), domestic donations Σ j C
*

cross-border donations Σ j*C

C * j*

( Σ jC

C j

).

10

Dj

( Σ j*C

D* j *

), and

Policymakers’ objective functions in the home country, G
foreign country, G

(13a)

M*

M

(τ ;τ ) , and those in the
*

(τ ;τ ) , are, respectively,
*

K
K
⎛
⎞
C j
G M τ ;τ * ≡ (1 − α − β )⎜⎜W τ ,τ * − ∑ C Dj (τ ) − ∑ C τ * ⎟⎟
j =1
j =1
⎝
⎠

(

)

(

)

( )

K

K*

j =1

j *=1

+ α ∑ C Dj (τ ) + β ∑ C C * j* (τ ) ,

(13b)

G

M*

(τ ;τ ) ≡ (1 − α
*

*

−β

)⎛⎜⎜W (τ ,τ ) − ∑ C (τ ) − ∑ C (τ )⎞⎟⎟
K*

*

*

K*

D* j *

*

⎝

C * j*

*

j *=1

⎠

j *=1

( )

K*

K

+ α * ∑ C D* j * τ * + β * ∑ C
j *=1

where 0 <

D* j *

j =1

(τ ),
*

β < 1 , 0 < β * < 1 , α ≤ 1 − β ≤ 2α , and α * ≤ 1 − β * ≤ 2α * . These restrictions

assure that all the donations to the home RP ( C
(C

C j

and C

C j

) have positive weights in G

(foreign) country chooses

M

and C

Dj

(τ ;τ )
*

C * j*

and G

) and those to the foreign RP

M*

(τ ;τ ) .
*

The RP of the home

τ i ( τ i* ) to maximize Equation (13a) (Equation (13b)), with τ i* ( τ i )

considered to be given.
I solve this problem backwards, in the same way as the domestic lobbying case.
the second stage, the home RP and the foreign RP decide
their objective functions.
(13b) with

τ i and τ i* , respectively, to maximize

Differentiation of Equation (13a) with

τ i and that of Equation

τ i* create the first-order conditions for maximization of objective functions for the

home RP as Equation (14a) and for the foreign RP as Equation (14b), respectively.
(14a)

At

K

K*

j =1

j *=1

GτMi ≡ (1 − α − β )Wτ i − (1 − 2α − β )∑ CτDji + β ∑ CτCi * j* = 0 ,
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(14b)

(

)

(

GτM* * ≡ 1 − α * − β * Wτ** − 1 − 2α * − β *
i

i

)∑ C
K*

j =1

K

D* j *

τ i*

+ β * ∑ Cτ * = 0 .
C j
i

j =1

Next, at the first stage, each SIG chooses its schedule of donations.

As in the previous

section, I focus on truthful equilibrium, where all lobbies make a positive contribution.

In

other words, in equilibrium, the following equations are satisfied.

(τ ) = W (τ ,τ ) − W

(15a)

C Dj (τ ) + C

(15b)

C D* j* τ * + C C * j* (τ ) = W * j* τ ,τ * − W * j* .

C j

*

*

j

( )

(

j

,

)

These conditions are the same as the definition of weakly truthful transfers by Prat and
Rustichini (2003).

Each SIG decides its contribution schedules to both home and foreign RPs

under the constraint of Equation (15a) or (15b).

That is, in a truthful equilibrium of contract

offers, the following conditions are satisfied for SIGs.
(16a)

C j

CτDji + Cτ *
i

(16a)

dτ i*
dτ i

CτD* * j* + CτCi * j*
i

= Wτ ij + Wτ *j
i

R*

dτ i
dτ i*

dτ i*
dτ i

= Wτ** j* + Wτ*i j*
i

R

,

CτDji

R*

dτ i
,
dτ i* R

dτ i
dτ i*

CτD* * j*
i

C j

+ Cτ * = Wτ ij
i

R

dτ i*
dτ i

dτ i
dτ i*

+ CτCi * j* = Wτ** j*
i

R*

+ Wτ *j ,
i

R

dτ i*
dτ i

+ Wτ*i j* .
R*

Solving Equations (16a) and (16b) produces the following equations.
(17a)

C j

CτDji = Wτ ij , Cτ * = Wτ *j ,
i

(17b)

i

CτDi * j* = Wτ*i j* , CτC** j* = Wτ *j* ,.
i

i

That is, when SIGs design their donation schedules to home and foreign RPs, all they need to
take into consideration is the direct effect of home and foreign tariffs on their welfare.
Strategic relationships between countries have no role to play in the case of multilateral
lobbying, because such an indirect effect is properly replaced by a direct effect.

In the absence

of contributions from home SIGs to the foreign RP, any rise in the home export/import tariffs
leads to a fall in the foreign import/export tariffs, which strategic effect home SIGs take into
consideration when they decide their donations schedules.
foreign tariff is, however, not efficient.

This indirect way to change the

By contributing to the foreign RP directly, this strategic

effect is eliminated in equilibrium so that only the direct effect remains, which promotes
efficiency of policy formation in the home country.

This is the first benefit of cross-border

political donations. The same arguments apply for the foreign country, and this result can be
rewritten as the following proposition.

Proposition 2. When both domestic and cross-border lobbying activities are permitted,
12

the schedules of donation presented by a SIG to a home RP and a foreign RP are determined by
the direct effect of home tariffs and foreign tariffs, respectively, on the SIG’s welfare.
Substitute Equations (17a) and (17b) into (14a) and (14b), then

Wτ i + ωWτ*i = 0 ,

(18a)
where

Wτ** + ω *Wτ * = 0 ,

(18b)

i

i

ω = β α and ω * = β * α * . These equations show that, in the case of multilateral

lobbying, the RP takes into account the impact of its trade policy on the welfare of the other
country through cross-border donations, which makes the RP more cooperative with the other
country.

This is the second benefit of cross-border political donations. Equations (18a) and

(18b) define reaction functions

τ iM (τ i* , ω ) for the home country and τ iM * (τ i , ω * ) for the

foreign country, respectively, for the case in which the RP accepts political donations from both
national SIGs and the other country’s SIGs, which are written as follows:

p iφi
pi*
*
(
)
+
ωτ
=
1
−
ω
+ ωτ i* ,
i
M*
M
ε i (1 − φi )
εi

(19a)

τ iM (τ i* , ω ) = (ω − 1)

(19b)

τ iM * (τ i , ω * ) = (ω * − 1)

pi*φ i*
p
+ ω *τ i = 1 − ω * Mi + ω *τ i .
*
M*
ε i 1 − φi
εi

(

(

)

)

From the comparison of Equations (19a) with (5), we see
home country is an importer of good i ( ε i

M

an exporter of it ( ε i

M

τ iM (τ i* , ω ) < τ iN (τ i* ) when the

< 0 ), while τ iN (τ i* ) < τ iM (τ i* , ω ) when the country is

> 0 ), at any τ i* and ω . This shows that the RP reduces trade barriers

in the case of multilateral lobbying, due to the two benefits of cross-border lobbying mentioned
above.

We also see again from Equation (19a) the monotonous relationship between

τ iM and

β : ∂τ iM ∂β < 0 when the country imports good i, while ∂τ iM ∂β > 0 when the country
exports it.

This shows that when the RP highly values cross-border donations, its trade

barriers decreases.

In the case of multilateral lobbying, the strategic relationships between

tariffs in two countries disappear, and the RP only counts the direct effect of its trade policy on
the welfare of both countries.

The reduction of trade barriers (export and import tariffs) in a

country is beneficial for the other country, and the more highly the RP values political
13

donations from abroad, the more the RP lowers its trade barriers for the foreign country.

From

Equations (19a) and (19b) I derived the third proposition.
Proposition 3.

When an RP accepts both domestic and cross-border donations, that

RP decreases its import/export tariffs.

The more highly an RP values cross-border donations

compared with domestic donations, the more the country’s tariffs decrease.
Comparing this condition with the case of no donations as in Section 2, the shift of
tariff reaction curves after admitting only domestic lobbying is in the opposite direction from
the shift of those after admitting multilateral lobbying.
between the SIG’s and RP’s behavior in two cases.

This results from the differences

Consider the relationship between the

donations schedules of SIGs and other country’s tariffs first.

In both cases, the home country’s

welfare increases when the foreign country lessens its export/import tariffs.

In order to have

the foreign RP decrease its trade barriers, in the case of domestic donations, home SIGs request
the home RP to increase its own export/import tariffs by means of domestic donations, which
leads the shift of reaction curves of home tariffs to the direction of enhancing trade barriers.
This is an indirect way of decreasing the other country’s trade taxes, by employing the strategic
relationships between trade policies.

In the case of multilateral lobbying, however, home SIGs

can use a direct way; they directly request the foreign RP to decrease its trade barriers by
means of cross-border donations. The reaction curves of home tariffs, therefore, don’t change.
Second, as for RPs’ objective functions, RPs don’t consider the welfare of the other country in
the case of domestic lobbying, and so the reaction curves of home tariffs don’t depend on it.

In

the case of multilateral lobbying, however, the home RP needs to take care of the other country’s
welfare, because it receives cross-border donations from foreign SIGs.
home tariffs, therefore, shift to the direction of lowering trade

The reaction curves of

barriers.11

5. Efficient Policies
Multilateral lobbying moves the trade policy of two countries toward a Pareto-efficient
pair of tariffs.

It doesn’t guarantee, however, that a new equilibrium locates on

Pareto-efficiency locus.

In this section, I examine closely the condition for multilateral

lobbying to yield Pareto efficiency and to maximize the weighted sum of two countries’ welfare.
A Pareto-efficiency locus is defined as the set of a pair of tariff vectors which satisfies
the following condition.
(20)

dτ i
dτ i*

=
dW = 0

dτ i
dτ i*

.
dW *= 0

14

(τ

PE

)

,τ * PE are the tariff vectors which satisfy Equation (20), and are called “efficient tariffs.”

The pair of efficient tariffs is achieved under the condition

ωω * = 1 , which is verified as

follows: dW = 0 and dW = 0 require the conditions, respectively,
*

(21a)

dτ
−
= *i ,
Wτ i dτ i
Wτ *

−

(21b)

i

Wτ**
i

*

Wτ i

=

dτ i
.
dτ i*

Under the equilibrium of multilateral lobbying, both Equations (18a) and (18b) are satisfied, so
if we substitute Equation (18b) into Equation (21a) and Equation (18a) into Equation (21b), we
find that Equation (20) is satisfied for all goods when
into Equation (18b), and we obtain Wτ * + ωWτ * = 0 .
*

i

ωω * = 1 . Next, substitute ωω * = 1

This equation and Equation (18a) are

i

considered to be the first-order conditions for maximization of the weighted sum of home and

ω is a weight for foreign welfare. From these arguments, I obtain the

foreign welfare, where
next proposition.

Proposition 4.
when ωω * = 1 .

(τ

PE

(τ

PE

)

,τ * PE attains equilibrium in the case of multilateral lobbying

)

,τ * PE maximizes the weighted sum of home and foreign welfare, where

ω is a weight for foreign welfare.
It is directly derived from Proposition 4 that the condition which maximizes the
unweighted sum of home and foreign welfare, i.e., world welfare, is

(ω , ω ) = (1,1) .
*

This

means that when each RP evaluates domestic and cross-border donations with the same weight
(α =

β and α * = β * ) potential benefit from multilateral lobbying is maximized.

The

following is a straightforward corollary of Proposition 4.

Corollary. World welfare is maximized when each RP makes no distinction between
domestic and cross-border donations.
Solving Equations (19a) and (19b) with the condition

(ω , ω ) = (1,1)
*

yields the result

τ i − τ i* = 0 . This condition implies that two countries set the net trade barriers of good i at
zero so as not to distort trade flows, and then the local prices of good i are equal to each other.

τ i − τ i* = 0 does not guarantee, however, that both countries increase their welfare by

15

multilateral lobbying, even when

τ i = τ i* = 0 . In order to assure that both countries are

better off, we need the introduction of a system of international income redistribution.

One

implication of this theoretical fact is that, in order to extract the full potential benefit from
multilateral lobbying, it is necessary not only to have each RP evaluate domestic and
cross-border donations with the same weight but also to establish some sort of international
institution which handles negotiations about international income transfer and its effective
execution.

It may require arduous negotiation to reach an agreement among nations to

establish such an institution and to launch an effective and powerful scheme of international
income transfer, beneficial for all participants.

The institution is, however, essential in

distributing the benefit of international policy coordination brought about through multilateral
lobbying to all nations.12

6. Extension: International Trade with Negative Externality
The model developed in the text doesn’t deal with the external effect.

Externality

does not, however, change the propositions mentioned above if welfare functions preserve
concavity.

This section illustrates this statement by introducing externality negative to

welfare into the model, along the lines of Ederington (2001), Conconi (2003), and Limão (2005).
They studied trade and domestic policies in large open countries with the presence of negative
externalities arising from their production.

In this section I examine the determination of

policies with the existence of negative externality, first in the context that there are only trade
policies, and second in the context that there are both trade and domestic policies.
6.1. The case of one policy tool: tariff
I slightly modify the model setting presented in Section 2; the productions of
non-numeraire goods are assumed to be accompanied by international negative externalities as
by-products in both countries.

This decreases the welfare of individuals in both countries in a

nonpecuniary manner. I examine hereinafter the determination of

(τ ,τ )
i

*
i

in the cases of

no-lobbying and of cross-lobbying.
The utility function of individuals (Equation (1)) is modified to the following form:
N

(22)

u (c0 , c1 ,..., c N , Z ) ≡ c0 + ∑ u i (ci ) − Z ,
i =1
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where Z is total externalities to the country from the productions of non-numeraire goods.
The degree of Z is a function of the outputs in both home and foreign countries as follows:

(

)

N

[

( (

))

))]

( (

Z τ ,τ * ≡ ∑ η id Yi pi τ i ,τ i* + η ic Yi* p i* τ i ,τ i* ,

(23)

where

i =1

η id ≥ 0 is the parameter of externality which represents the extent to which domestic

production of good i decreases the utility of individuals.

η ic ≥ 0 is the parameter of

cross-border externality from the production of good i in the other country.
the same as Conconi (2003).

If

η ic = η ic* = 0 , then there is no cross-border externality

concerning the production of good i, which case Ederington (2001) considered.
and

Equation (23) is

If

η ic = η id ≠ 0

η ic* = η id* ≠ 0 , then the externalities from two countries are completely indifferent for the

home and the foreign, respectively.13
Domestic welfare is redefined as the total amount of labor income, rent, tariff revenue,
consumer surplus, plus the negative effect of externalities.
(24)

N
N
H
⎡H
⎤
W τ ,τ * ≡ L + ∑ Ri τ i ,τ i* + ∑τ i M i τ i ,τ i* + H ⎢∑ u i ci τ i ,τ i* − ∑ pi ci τ i ,τ i* ⎥
i =1
i =1
i =1
⎣ i =1
⎦

(

)

(

)

(

(

)

( (

))

(

)

)

− HZ τ ,τ * .
When the RP sets its tariff unilaterally to maximize its domestic welfare, taking the
tariff of the other country as given, the resulting reaction function of tariff on good i is defined
by

pi*

Hη id ε iY Hη ic ε iY *
− * M* ,
mi ε iM
mi ε i

(25)

τi =

where

ε iY ≡ (∂Yi ∂pi )( pi Yi ) > 0 ,

ε iM *

mi* ≡ M i* Yi * .
Hη id ε iY mi ε iM

+

ε iY * ≡ (∂Yi * ∂pi* )( pi* Yi* ) > 0 ,

mi ≡ M i Yi

,

and

Compared with Equation (5), Equation (25) has two additional terms:
and Hη ic ε i

Y*

mi*ε iM * .

Hη id ε iY mi ε iM
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represents the welfare effect of

externalities from the local production of good i, which varies according to the local price of good

i.

Hη id ε iY mi ε iM < 0 always holds, which means that the increase of τ i strengthens the

negative externality on local welfare through the increase of the local price of good i and,
therefore, the production of it.14

Hη ic ε iY * mi*ε iM * represents, on the other hand, the welfare

effect of externalities from the foreign production of good i.
holds, which means that the increase of

− Hη ic ε iY * mi*ε iM * > 0 always

τ i lessens the negative externality, through the

decrease of the foreign price of good i, which decreases in turn the foreign production of good i.
The reaction function of

τ i , determined from Equation (25), might be higher or lower than that

from Equation (5), depending on the relative strengths of these two terms.
In the case of multilateral lobbying with

(ω , ω ) = (1,1) , the reaction functions of
*

tariffs on good i in the home and foreign countries are expressed as15
(26)

τi =

(Hη

id

)

+ H *η ic* ε iY
< 0.
mi ε iM

Equation (26) shows that the level of

τ i is determined by the effect of τ i on negative

externality caused from the domestic production of good i to the welfare of the home country,

Hη id ε iY mi ε iM , and by the effect on externality to the welfare of the foreign country,
H *η ic ε iY mi ε iM . This form represents the fact that optimal assignment for trade policy in a
country, with the existence of negative externality, exists to redress its own externality.
Equation (26) doesn’t include the term of optimal tariff.

The monopoly power of countries is

eliminated completely in order to maximize world welfare.
6.2. The case of two policy tools: tariff and production tax
The previous part considers tariffs of two countries as a single policy tool.

The

theoretical framework of this paper can apply, however, to the more general situation where
each country has more than one policy tool.

I consider in this part the case where each country
18

has two policy tools: tariff (trade policy) and production tax (domestic policy).
The theoretical framework in the case of two policy tools is similar to that in the
previous part.

One critical difference is that there is a wedge between consumer and producer

prices because of the introduction of a vector of specific production taxes t = (t1 ,..., t N ) .

The

producer price of good i is thus equal to pis = piw + τ i − t i , while the consumer price is

pic = piw + τ i . The output of good i is redefined as Yi ( p is ) = ∂Ri ∂pis , the total externalities
to

the

country

is

Z

expressed

(

)

N

[

( (

Z τ , t ,τ * , t * ≡ ∑ η id Yi pis τ i , t i ,τ i* , t i*

as

i =1

))

))]

( (

+ η ic Yi* pis* τ i , t i ,τ i* , t i* , net import demand is M i ( pic , pis ) = Di ( p ic ) − Yi ( pis ) , and the world
equilibrium price which satisfies the market-clearing condition is given by piw

(τ , t ,τ
i

i

*
i

)

, t i* .

Domestic welfare is then rewritten in the same form as Conconi (2003).

(

)

(

N

)

(

N

)

N

(

W τ , t ,τ * , t * ≡ L + ∑ Ri τ i , t i ,τ i* , t i* + ∑τ i M i τ i , t i ,τ i* , t i* + ∑ t i Yi τ i , t i ,τ i* , t i*

(27)

i =1

i =1

H
⎡H
+ H ⎢∑ u i ci τ i , t i ,τ i* , t i* − ∑ pic ci τ i , t i ,τ i* , t i*
i =1
⎣ i =1

( (

))

(

i =1

)⎤⎥ − HZ (τ , t ,τ
⎦

*

)

)

,t* .

Objective functions of RPs and donation schedules of SIGs are extended so as to incorporate t
and t

*

in the same manner as

τ and τ * .16

When the RP sets its tariff and production tax unilaterally to maximize its domestic
welfare, taking the tariff of the other country as given, the resulting reaction functions of tariff
and production tax on good i are defined by, respectively,
and t i = Hη id .

In this case,

τ i = ( pi* ε iM * ) − (Hη ic ε iY * mi*ε iM * )

τ i is determined from the terms of trade effect: pi* ε iM * is the

direct welfare effect of the change of the terms of trade by

τ i , while − Hη ic ε iY * mi*ε iM * is the

indirect welfare effect through the change of negative externality from the production of the
other country, which is caused by the change of the terms of trade.
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t i is, on the other hand,

set from the level of negative externality from the home production: t i = Hη id
nondistortionary production tax to counter the local direct externality.
independent of

is a

Note that t i is

τ i , τ i* , and t i* , while τ i and τ i* are interdependent.

In the case of multilateral lobbying, the schedule of donations from j-SIG in the home
country

is

(

slightly

rewritten

from

Equation

(15a)

to

C Dj (τ , t ) + C

C j

(τ

*

)

,t* =

)

W j τ , t ,τ * , t * − W j . In a truthful equilibrium of contract offers, the conditions C tDj
= Wti j
i
C j

and C t *
i

the

(ε (t
Y
i

i

equilibrium

i

(

)

= Wt *j are satisfied, in addition to Equation (17a), for j-SIG. When ω , ω * = (1,1) ,
tariffs

)

− Hη id − H *η ic* mi

and

production

) − (ε (t
Y*
i

*
i

taxes

)

are

derived

as

τ i − τ i* = 0

)

− Hη ic − H *η id* mi* = 0 , respectively.

and

The former

condition is the same as that in Section 6, while the latter condition requires total production
tax revenue of the world to be equal to total welfare loss of the world from negative externalities
of productions.

7. Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the effects of lobbying activities across borders on determining
trade policies in a multi-principal, multi-agent, and menu-auction model.

The main result is

that multilateral lobbying, i.e., the situation in which both domestic and cross-border lobbying
activities are permitted, brings the equilibrium of tariffs in countries towards the
Pareto-efficiency locus, on the assumption that all the individuals belong to one of the domestic
SIGs.

When each RP evaluates political contributions from national SIGs and from abroad

with the same weight, a Pareto-efficiency is attained at which the unweighted sum of the two
countries’ welfare is maximized.

In other words, in order to maximize world welfare, each

government should allow every party the right to raise political funds from abroad, and each
party should treat all the contributions equally, regardless of the nation of origin.
This result reestablishes the theoretical findings of Becker (1983) and Grossman and
Helpman (1994) about the relationship of lobbying and efficient policies.

Becker (1983)

presented the proposition that competition among pressure groups favors efficient methods of
20

domestic taxation in a country, and Grossman and Helpman (1994) stated that in a small
economy free trade prevails when all voters belong to one of the interest groups.

My analysis

extends these statements, and proposes that efficient policies are successfully adopted even in
the case of large countries, if RPs treat domestic and cross-border donations equally.

This

would not assure, however, that the new equilibrium of the Pareto-efficient tariffs is beneficial
for all countries.

To convert efficiently the potential benefit of multilateral lobbying into an

actual benefit for each country, an effective and powerful international scheme for income
transfer is essential.
Readers may doubt some of the assumptions in the model, especially those about
principals (SIGs), agents (RPs), and an outcome (truthful equilibrium) of a menu-auction.
First, as for SIGs, an extreme assumption is that every individual can express his or her
preference to both home and foreign RPs through the SIG to which it belongs.

Reflecting on

the behavior of actual SIGs, it is natural to consider the existence of some political costs of
forming and maintaining SIGs, which result in some individuals choosing not to participate in
lobbying activities.
formation.

Mitra (1999) introduces this political cost and analyzes endogenous lobby

My assumption corresponds to Mitra’s model when every individual participates in

a SIG and costs of lobbying are sufficiently low.

I have to admit, however, that collecting

information on the tax policies of all countries and making out their schedules of donation could
be laborious work for all SIGs.

Second, as for RPs, the total amount of donations each RP

collects becomes excessively large when all SIGs follow truthful transfers, since each RP has a
monopolistic power in the legislative branch of government.
behavior by political parties is unacceptable to citizens.
truthful transfers might be suspect.

This kind of fund-collecting

And third, the practicability of

Kirchsteiger and Prat (2001) run an experiment and find

that the truthful alternative is chosen in only a fraction of all matches.

This undermines our

discussion, since truthful equilibrium is a crucial characteristic of all the propositions presented
in the text.
Despite these caveats, the main message of this analysis still holds.
political contributions per se are not harmful in the world.

That is, foreign

Rather, they help every

government to be aware of foreign concern for its economic policy, and to become more sensitive
to the impact of its policy on world welfare.

Binding contracts of cross-border political

contributions with overseas RPs are efficient tools by which SIGs can reveal their interests in
the economic policies of foreign countries.

In this sense, free international lobbying serves well

as a catalyst for creating a more cooperative and efficient world economy.

Some may think

that cross-border donations become threats against nations, sovereignty and their right to
political self-determination. With the rise of multinational corporations and the increase in
foreign trade and investment, foreign people seek to influence the domestic policies of the
21

nations in which they do business.

This growing foreign political influence has caused elected

officials of many countries to fear that their nations’ political and economic independence is at
risk.

Seen from a different point of view, these domestic concerns are an indication that

governments need to take into account the impact of their legislation on the welfare of other
countries. Based on the model in this paper, such awareness can be considered an important
component in future meaningful international cooperation.

22

Table 1: Number of countries which ban foreign donations:
by income and region

Is there a full ban on foreign donations to political parties?

Yes

No

40

71

100,000 plus

14

15

10,000 - 99,999

13

13

1,000 - 9,999

11

25

up to 999

2

18

10,000 plus

11

17

3,000 - 9,999

10

19

1,000 - 2,999

10

15

up to 999

9

20

Total:
GDP (million US$, 2003):

Per capita GDP (US$, 2003):

Region:

23

Africa

4

19

The Americas

12

20

Asia

6

4

Europe

17

17

Oceania

1

11

Source: Austin and Tjernström (2003), World Bank (2004)
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Appendix: First-Order Conditions in Section 6.2.
First-order conditions for maximizing Equation (27) with respect to

t i* are, respectively,
(A.1)

⎛ ∂D
∂Y
Wτ i ≡ M iφi + τ i ⎜⎜ i − i
⎝ ∂pic ∂pis

⎞
∂Y
⎟⎟(1 − φi ) + t i i (1 − φi )
∂pis
⎠
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τ i , t i , τ i* , and

*
⎡ ∂Yi
⎤
(1 − φi ) − η c ∂Yi* φi ⎥ = 0 ,
− H ⎢η d
∂p is ⎦
⎣ ∂pis

(A.2)

⎞
⎛ ∂D
∂Y
∂Y
Wti ≡ − M i δ i + τ i ⎜⎜ i δ i − i (δ i − 1)⎟⎟ + t i i (δ i − 1)
∂pis
∂pis
⎠
⎝ ∂pic
⎡ ∂Yi
∂Yi* ⎤
(1 − δ i ) − η c * δ i ⎥ = 0 ,
+ H ⎢η d
∂pis ⎦
⎣ ∂p is
⎡ ∂Yi *
⎤
⎞ *
∂Y
∂Y *
⎟⎟φ i − t i i φi* + H ⎢η d
φi − η c i* (1 − φi )⎥ = 0 ,
∂pis
∂pis
⎠
⎣ ∂pis
⎦

(A.3)

⎛ ∂D
∂Y
Wτ * ≡ M iφi* − τ i ⎜⎜ i − i
i
⎝ ∂pic ∂p is

(A.4)

⎛ ∂D
∂Y
Wt * ≡ − M i δ i* + τ i ⎜⎜ i − i
i
⎝ ∂pic ∂pis

where

⎡ ∂Yi *
⎤
⎞ *
∂Y
∂Y *
⎟⎟δ i + t i i δ i* − H ⎢η d
δ i − η c i* 1 − δ i* ⎥ = 0 ,
∂pis
∂p is
⎠
⎣ ∂pis
⎦

(

)

δ i = ∂piw ∂t i , δ i* = ∂piw ∂t i* , 0 < δ i < 1 , and 0 < δ i* < 1 . Reaction functions of tariff

and production tax on good i,

τ i = ( pi* ε iM * ) − (Hη ic ε iY * mi*ε iM * ) and t i = Hη id , are acquired

from Equations (A.1), (A.2), and the market-clearing condition, assuming
When

φi ≠ δ i .

(ω , ω ) = (1,1) , the equilibrium tariffs and production taxes which maximize
*

world welfare satisfy the following conditions.
(A.5)

Wτ i + Wτ*i = 0 ,

(A.6)

Wti + Wti* = 0 ,

(A.7)

Wτ * + Wτ** = 0 ,
i

(A.8)

i

Wt * + Wt** = 0 .
i

i

One way of calculating the equilibrium tariffs and production taxes is as follows: from
Equations (A.5) and (A.7), Wτ i + Wτ i + Wτ * + Wτ * = 0 , assuming
*

*

i

i
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φi + φi* ≠ 1 .

Also, from

Equations (A.6) and (A.8), Wti + Wti + Wt * + Wt * = 0 , assuming
*

*

i

equations,

we

( (

acquire

)

i

τ i − τ i* = 0

and

δ i + δ i* ≠ 1 . From these two

(ε (t
Y
i

i

− Hη id − H *η ic* ) mi

)

)

− ε iY * t i* − Hη ic − H *η id* mi* = 0 .

1

The positive and negative opinions for political donation from abroad in the context of the U.K.

are well summarized in the report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (Committee on
Standards in Public Life, the U.K., 1998), presented to the Parliament in 1998 as background
material to discuss the regulations of political funding.

In this document, the arguments

against the imposition of a ban on foreign donations are categorized into six points as follows
(Volume 1, pp. 65-68).

(1) There are a number of political parties within the U.K. which rely on

and value contributions from those living overseas.

(2) There is nothing intrinsically wrong

with an overseas donation, provided that it does not come from a foreign government.
28

(3) The

impact of foreign donations has been exaggerated.

(4) It is difficult to stipulate a satisfactory

definition of the persons and corporations which must be treated as foreign, for the purpose of a
legislative ban on foreign donations.

(5) Concerning the upsurge of requirements for

transparency and disclosure of political funding, this is not the time to introduce a further
legislative restriction on the ability of political parties to secure adequate funding.

(6) Two

special cases: the treatment of some territories which come under the sovereignty of the U.K.
and of future cross-border parties in Europe. This document presents, as well, the arguments
in favor of a ban including the following four points: (1) Since political parties are involved in
the domestic process taking place within the U.K., political parties should be confined to
seeking financial support from those entitled to vote for them.

(2) Disclosure is not enough.

(3) Such difficulties as there may be with the legislative definition of a ban must be tackled, and
the best solution possible produced.

(4) Allowing donations from dependent territories would

potentially open up a substantial loophole in the prohibition of foreign donations.
2

The first U.S. law banning foreign contributions to political campaigns was enacted in 1966.

The amended Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) declared it a felony for a foreign
principal to use an agent to contribute to domestic election campaigns or for a candidate to
accept or solicit such contributions. The language of this prohibition, however, still permitted
foreign nationals to provide funds directly to candidates.

After this loophole was widely

recognized through the Watergate hearings, Congress revised the Federal Election Campaign
Act to prohibit contributions from any foreign national in 1974.

Despite this revision, foreign

money can still enter U.S. campaign treasuries through U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
corporations.

In general, U.S. law prohibits direct contributions from corporations to federal

political campaigns, but U.S. corporations may establish political action committees (PACs),
which have the right to make limited campaign contributions.

Thus, a U.S.-incorporated,

foreign-owned company’s PACs could serve as a conduit for foreign funds to U.S. electoral
campaigns, provided that they are registered with the Justice Department in accordance with
the FARA (Damrosch, 1989; Powell, 1996).

The definition of “foreign agent” in Gawande,

Krishna, and Robbins (2004) and Kee, Olarreaga, and Silva (2004) refers to this type of PAC.
Note that both papers use the gross amount of money for agents’ activities in the U.S. as a
variable for the extent of their presence in the U.S. political arena.

In contrast, the amount of

political donations to politicians has a key role in my research.
3

The home and the foreign countries have similar economic structures, so I don’t refer to

conditions for the foreign country explicitly in Sections 2, 3, and 6 in the text.
4

When the country is a net importer of good i,

τ i > 0 and τ i < 0 mean an import tax and an
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import subsidy, respectively. When the country is a net exporter of good i,

τ i > 0 and τ i < 0

denote an export subsidy and an export tax, respectively.
5

This model setting doesn’t deal with the external effect.

Externality does not change the

results of this paper if welfare functions preserve concavity concerning

τ and τ * . See

Section 6, for an example.
6

G N is the function of τ , with τ * as given; the RP of the home country uses τ as a policy

instrument, but it cannot manipulate a foreign country’s policy instrument
7

τ * directly.

In the case of a small country, this assumption brings the result that free trade prevails in all

sectors, as shown in Grossman and Helpman (1994), because the various SIGs neutralize one
another. In the setting of this model, however, the results turn out to be different.
8

I focus on equilibrium where all SIGs make a positive amount of political contributions to the

RP.
9

It is assumed that the rise in the tariff on good i ( τ i ) increases its local price ( pi ) even though

it also leads to the rise in the other country’s tariff ( τ i ), which in turn decreases the home
*

country’s price of good i ( pi ).

(

)(

It is expressed as 0 < (∂p i ∂τ i ) + ∂p i ∂τ i dτ i dτ i
*

*

)

R*

, or

φi* (dτ i* dτ i ) R* < 1 − φi .
10

The

condition

π i < 1 − φi

comes

from

the

condition

mentioned

in

footnote

8:

π i ≤ φi* (dτ i* dτ i ) R* < 1 − φi , since 0 < ϕ ≤ 1 .
11

The model of multilateral lobbying presented in the text has enough applicability for the case

of international SIGs.

The role of international SIGs, organized by some SIGs in different

countries, on the determination of trade policies was originally examined by Conconi (2003).
In the context of my model, when some home and foreign SIGs form an international coalition
and aim at maximizing an unweighted sum of their welfare by giving political contributions to
both the home and foreign countries, the international SIG designs its donation to home and
foreign RPs considering only the direct effect of home and foreign tariffs on its aggregate
welfare, respectively.
disappear.

Again, strategic relationships between trade policies of the two countries

Therefore, incorporating international SIGs into my model does not change the

main argument in the text.
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12

Though mechanism design of international income redistribution is an important problem, it

is outside of the scope of this paper.
13

It is possible for total externalities to have a more general form concerning the output of

goods, as long as strong concavity of utility functions is preserved.

If the reader interprets

negative externalities as environmental pollution, it might be natural to consider that total
externalities are the function of accumulated pollutants produced from past economic activities.
The accumulation of externalities, however, is beyond the comparative static analysis.
14

When the country is an importer of good 1, this term means that the country has an

incentive to decrease its import tariff so as to decrease the domestic price of good 1 and then
reduce its domestic production.

When the country is an exporter of good 1, on the other hand,

this term shows the incentive to elevate its export tariff.

φi + φi* ≠ 1 in order to avoid the indetermination of equilibrium tariffs.

15

It is assumed that

16

The derivation of first-order conditions in this part can be found in the Appendix.
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